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Haida Nation and Taku River:  
A Commentary on Aboriginal 
Consultation and Reconciliation 
E. Ria Tzimas* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On November 18, 2004 the Supreme Court of Canada released its 
two landmark decisions on Aboriginal consultation. Haida Nation v. 
British Columbia (Minister of Forests),1 and Taku River Tlingit First 
Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director),2 together, 
provide the most significant discussion to date by the Court on Aborigi-
nal consultation. The main issue before the Court was very narrow: did 
the governments have an obligation to consult Aboriginal peoples over 
government authorized activities in instances where the Aboriginal 
rights were unknown, uncertain, or in dispute, and if so, the extent of 
that obligation. Uncertainty over the existence or extent of an asserted 
right made it difficult to draw conclusions with any certainty over the 
extent of any potential infringement, and the further extent of what 
might amount to an appropriate interim agreement or accommodation. 
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that where the Crown, 
federal or provincial, has “knowledge, real or constructive,” of the po-
tential existence of an Aboriginal right, title or a treaty right, and con-
templates conduct that might adversely affect that right or title, the 
honour of the Crown requires the Crown to consult and in some circum-
stances accommodate that interest. The content and extent of the consul-
tation and possible accommodation is determined by both the strength of 
the asserted interest and the degree of the potential infringement of the 
                                                                                                                                
*
  The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not represent the 
views of the Government of Ontario. 
1
  [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 [hereinafter “Haida”]. 
2
  [2004] S.C.J. No. 69, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550 [hereinafter “Taku River”]. 
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intended government action. The Court also concluded that Aboriginal 
claimants should advance their claims with clarity, focusing on the 
scope and nature of the rights they assert and on the alleged infringe-
ments. The obligation by the Crown to accommodate was defined as 
seeking a compromise or “harmonizing conflicting interests” so as to 
move “further down the path of reconciliation.” In its analysis of the 
scope and content of consultation, the Court acknowledged that the 
strength of asserted claims may vary and therefore articulated a corre-
sponding consultation spectrum, ranging from notification to accommo-
dation. With respect to third parties who are typically the proponents 
seeking government authorization for their actions, whether an approval 
of a project, a licence, or some other regular intervention, the Court 
reversed the B.C. Court of Appeal’s conclusion that they shared in the 
duty to consult. Instead, the Court signaled that third parties might have 
specific obligations assigned to them to assist with the overall consulta-
tion process. Although governments could not delegate their constitu-
tional duties to consult Aboriginal people, they could use their 
legislative capacity to involve third parties in the conduct of effective 
consultations.  
There can be little doubt that the two judgments have and will con-
tinue to have profound implications on the governments’ conduct, not 
only vis-à-vis Aboriginal peoples but in their overall interaction and 
balancing of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal public interests. However, 
it is far from obvious that the judgments reflect quite the constitutional 
paradigm shift suggested by Professor Slattery, or that they provide a 
basis for questioning provincial jurisdiction even in the face of Aborigi-
nal title assertions. What is clear is that the judgments are grounded 
firmly on the existing jurisprudence not only as it concerns Aboriginal 
disputes, but more broadly speaking as it concerns the overall operation 
of the Canadian Constitution. This is reflected in the extent to which the 
Court focused on reconciliation as the endpoint of any consultation. Be 
it the balancing of interests, the give and take by both sides, accommo-
dation and sharing, the Court’s clear message is to urge everyone to 
work together within the existing constitutional structure to find com-
mon ground and common solutions. That message is neither unique to 
Aboriginal disputes nor new to the constitutional discourse. The Court 
discussed reconciliation as a key animus of the Constitution in Refer-
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ence re Secession of Quebec.3 In Haida and in Taku River the Court 
anchored its analysis on the view that the diversity of interests, Aborigi-
nal and non-Aboriginal alike can be reconciled within the unity of the 
principles of federalism encompassed by the Constitution. When viewed 
from that perspective, although the analysis and questions raised by 
professors Slattery and McNeil are challenging and provocative, it is 
doubtful that this Court would look to either a paradigm shift or a radi-
cal change on questions of jurisdiction to address Aboriginal concerns. 
The more likely progression will be to continue to find solutions within 
the four corners of the Constitution.  
The following is a commentary on the analysis and conclusions of-
fered by professors Slattery and McNeil. To bring the discussion into 
focus, the first part offers an overview of the two cases. The second part 
analyzes the key components of the two judgments with reference and 
contrasts to the suggestions and analyses offered by professors Slattery 
and McNeil. The third part takes a close look at the Court’s emerging 
vision of reconciliation and considers the ingredients that might be re-
quired to effect reconciliation in the context of Aboriginal concerns. The 
commentary concludes with some thoughts on where the discussion 
concerning Aboriginal consultation and reconciliation is likely to go and 
what the future challenges might be.  
II. OVERVIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT OF  
CANADA’S DECISIONS IN HAIDA NATION AND  
TAKU RIVER TLINGIT FIRST NATION 
1. Background  
Both Haida and Taku River concerned Aboriginal consultation in 
instances where the existence and extent of alleged Aboriginal title 
rights were uncertain and in dispute. In both instances, British Columbia 
took the position that there could be no duty to consult under section 35 
of the Constitution Act, 1982, until the existence of Aboriginal title was 
proven in Court. This resulted in a tension over when to consult, what to 
consult about in the face of uncertainty, how to account for asserted 
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  [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. 
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rights, and what kinds of interim solutions might be reached to respond 
to the concerns in the least disruptive ways. The background and the 
particular histories of the cases are useful to understand, as they set up 
the context against which the Court articulated its conclusions on con-
sultation.  
(a) Taku River Tlingit First Nation  
At issue in Taku River was a project by Redfern Resources Ltd. to 
re-open the Tulsequah Chief Mine, previously operated by Cominco 
Ltd. in the 1950s. Redfern intended to extract approximately 2,500 
tonnes of ore per day. The mine is located in northern British Columbia 
near the border between the Yukon Territory and the state of Alaska. A 
controversial aspect of the project centred on Redfern’s stated plan to 
build an access road to the mine site to haul the ore from the Tulsequah 
Chief Mine to the Town of Atlin. The road would cross a portion of the 
traditional territory of the Tlingit First Nation where the First Nation’s 
traditional land use activities were most concentrated. Although the area 
is not covered by treaty, at the relevant time the area was the subject of 
treaty negotiations between the Tlingit and the governments of Canada 
and British Columbia. The Court also noted that the First Nation’s tradi-
tional territory encompassed the whole of the Taku River watershed, 
and that the Tlingit relied on hunting, fishing and gathering to sustain 
themselves.4 
In September 1994, Redfern applied for the requisite approval for 
the road under B.C.’s Environmental Assessment Act (EAA). A Project 
Committee was established under the EAA to review the process and to 
make recommendations to the executive director of the Environmental 
Assessment Office. Members of the committee included representatives 
from the federal and provincial governments as well as the Tlingit. For 
three and one half years, the process “apparently accommodated the 
expressed needs” of the Tlingit First Nation who at all times asserted 
their Aboriginal rights and their concerns about the impact of the pro-
posed road on their cultural habitat and on their treaty negotiations. 
Following the production of the Project Committee Report and the Tlin-
git’s Recommendations Report to the Minister of the Environment, 
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  Taku River, supra, note 2, at paras. 30-32. 
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Lands and Parks, and the Minister of Energy Mines and Petroleum Re-
sources, the Ministers issued a Project Approval Certificate, the process 
then came to a halt.5 
The lower court set aside the Minister’s decision to issue a Project 
Approval Certificate. The majority of the B.C. Court of Appeal dis-
missed the province’s and Redfern’s appeal and held that even in the 
face of asserted but not proven rights, the Crown owed a constitutional 
and fiduciary duty to consult the Taku River Tlingit First Nation.  
(b) Haida Nation 
In Haida, the Council of the Haida Nation, the governing body of 
the Haida Nation, brought an application for judicial review of several 
decisions of the Minister of Forests in 1981, 1995, and 2000 to replace 
Tree Farm Licence 39 (T.F.L. 39) and to approve the transfer from 
MacMillan Bloedel Limited to Weyerhaeuser Company Limited in 
2000. Haida Nation alleged that the Minister acted either without juris-
diction or in excess of jurisdiction.  
Some of the essential facts animating the case were the following: 
 
• The Haida have inhabited the Queen Charlotte Islands continuously 
from at least 1774 (the time of first contact) to the present; 
• From at least 1846 to the present the Haida were the only Aborigi-
nal people living on the Queen Charlotte Islands. They never sur-
rendered their Aboriginal rights and always claimed Aboriginal title 
to all of the lands comprising the Queen Charlotte Islands; and, 
• From a time which is uncertain, but that in any event pre-dates 1846 
(the time of assertion of British sovereignty) the Haida used red ce-
dar trees from the old-growth forests of the Queen Charlotte Islands 
for the construction of canoes, houses, totem poles, masks, boxes 
and other objects of art, ceremony and utility, such that red cedar has 
always been an integral part of the Haida culture. In the Supreme 
                                                                                                                                
5
  Based on the submissions before the Supreme Court of Canada, the consultative process 
over three and one half years came to a halt, in large measure because the Tlingits were seeking to 
veto Redfern’s proposals and were not in fact prepared to come to a compromise. Counsel for the 
Tlingit suggested that the Tlingits were seeking “collateral sustainability” and not a veto, but 
counsel for Redfern highlighted for the Court correspondence by the Tlingit that spoke of absolute 
consent and a veto. 
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Court of Canada in their oral submissions, the Haida Nation spoke 
of the red cedar as “their sister.”6 
 
Against these facts, the Haida argued that until its title claim is re-
solved, the Crown has an obligation to treat the lands in question as if 
they were encumbered by “Haida Nation title.” The province argued that 
there was no obligation to consult until title is proven.  
The lower court rejected the notion of a presumptive encumbrance 
because it would force the Crown to justify its conduct in relation to an 
unproven right. That would have the effect of giving priority to the 
Haida interest without an understanding of the extent of the alleged right 
claimed. Specifically, the lower Court concluded that the Crown’s fidu-
ciary obligations could not be determined in the absence of a trial on 
that issue. In law, without proven rights, the court held that there was no 
legal obligation on the part of the province to consult. The lower Court 
did speculate that on the strength of the evidence before it, there was 
probably a “moral duty to consult.” 
The B.C. Court of Appeal rejected the concern over the presumption 
of title and the implications for the Crown and instead purported to 
“solve” the issue of alleged but not as yet proven rights, by creating a 
free-standing obligation to consult grounded in broad notions of the 
Crown’s fiduciary obligations. The crucial conclusion on this point was 
that:  
The duty to consult and seek accommodation does not arise simply 
from a Sparrow analysis of s. 35. It stands on the broader fiduciary 
footing of the Crown’s relationship with the Indian peoples who are 
under its protection.7 
And in additional reasons, Lambert J. of the Court of Appeal noted that: 
The fiduciary duty of the Crown, federal or provincial, is a duty to 
behave towards the Indian people with utmost good faith and to put 
the interests of the Indian people under the protection of the Crown so 
                                                                                                                                
6
  Significantly more detail concerning the history and the circumstances of the Haida Na-
tion is outlined in the lower court decision, Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 
[2000] B.C.J. No. 2427, 36 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 155 (S.G.), at paras. 6 and 24, which were adopted by 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal, [2002] B.C.J. No. 1882, and additional reasons at [2002] 
B.C.J. No. 378, 99 B.C.L.R. (3d) 209 (C.A.). 
7
  Haida, [2002] B.C.J. No. 378, 99 B.C.L.R. (3d) 209, at para. 55 (C.A.). 
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that, in cases of conflicting rights, the interests of the Indian people, to 
whom the fiduciary duty is owed, must not be subordinated by the 
Crown to competing interests of other persons to whom the Crown 
owes no fiduciary duty. All the principles which must inform the tests 
for justification of a prima facie infringement, such as consultation, 
accommodation, and minimal impairment, represent examples of the 
Crown’s fiduciary duty to Indian peoples. 8 
Grounded on principles of fiduciary law Lambert J. extended the 
obligation to consult and to accommodate, not only to the Crown but to 
third parties. He used the doctrine of “knowing receipt” to conclude that 
by virtue of Weyerhaeuser’s awareness of the Crown fiduciary obliga-
tions and by stepping into the relationship, it too would assume fiduci-
ary obligations to the Haida. 
2.  The Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada  
British Columbia’s conduct passed Supreme Court scrutiny in Taku 
River but failed in Haida. Although admittedly, both the Haida and the 
Tlingit presented strong prima facie Aboriginal title and rights asser-
tions, thus eclipsing the concerns raised by several Crowns on the diffi-
culties that uncertain assertions raise, the Supreme Court did not view 
the uncertainty over the existence and extent of the asserted rights as an 
impediment to consultation. The prospects of constitutionally protected 
rights being somehow compromised, even if such rights were undefined 
or unclear, made it necessary to err on the side of caution and protect 
them. Such protection could be achieved through consultation.  
With that view of consultation, the Supreme Court concluded that 
British Columbia’s failure to conduct any consultation with the Haida 
was fatal. By comparison, in Taku River, where the consultation was 
considered “deep,” unfolding over the course of three and one half 
years, with continued participation by the Tlingit, the Court concluded 
that British Columbia had met its consultation obligations. Moreover, in 
the face of the province’s significant efforts to balance the interests of 
the Tlingit with those of Redfern, the Court rejected the argument by the 
Tlingit to the effect that in the absence of an agreement between them 
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  Haida, [2002] B.C.J. No. 1882, 2002 BCCA 462, at para. 62. 
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and the province, the consultation efforts were inadequate, and that the 
province could not issue the Project Certificate.  
The primary value of the two judgments lies in the analytical 
framework that the Supreme Court laid out. To appreciate the parame-
ters of that framework, to evaluate the applicability of these judgments 
to other factual circumstances, and to consider whether they signal any 
shifts in the Aboriginal/constitutional discourse it is necessary to review 
the constitutive elements of the judgment: (a) the honour of the Crown; 
(b) the timing, scope, and context of the duty to consult and accommo-
date; (c) the question of provincial jurisdiction; (d) the obligations of 
Aboriginal claimants; and (e) the challenge to government conduct. 
(a) The Honour of the Crown 
The Supreme Court launched its analysis with its conclusion that the 
source for the duty to consult Aboriginal peoples over asserted claims lies 
in the concept of the honour of the Crown. Historically, “the honour of the 
Crown” related to the 19th century English legal principle that the King 
could do no wrong.9 The animating idea behind this principle was that the 
Crown, as head of the state of England, was a benevolent leader who 
would not knowingly aggrieve a subject nor fail to observe a promise.  
In the context of Aboriginal cases the Supreme Court of Canada had 
previously used the “honour of the Crown” as an interpretative tool to 
determine the legal content of treaties, and in particular to resolve ambi-
guities.10 After 1982, the concept of the honour of the Crown was also 
used to describe the content of the legal duties owed by the Crown to 
                                                                                                                                
9
  In the words of Lord Denman, the benevolent leader would not knowingly aggrieve a 
subject nor fail to observe a promise to even “the meanest and most criminal of his subjects,” The 
King v. Garside and Mosley (1834), 2 AD. & E. 266, 111 E.R. 103, at 107 and 276 (K.B.). 
10
  A frequently cited statement of this approach was set out by the Ontario Court of Appeal 
in R. v. Taylor (1982), 34 O.R. (2d) 360, 62 C.C.C (2d) 172, at V, where MacKinnon, A.C.J.O., 
writing for the court, stated: 
The principles to be applied to the interpretation of Indian treaties have been much 
canvassed over the years. In approaching the terms of a treaty quite apart from the other 
considerations already noted, the honour of the Crown is always involved and no appear-
ance of “sharp dealing” should be sanctioned. 
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Aboriginal peoples pursuant to section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 
1982. 11 
In Haida and Taku River, the honour of the Crown emerged as a 
sufficiently fluid concept that it could diffuse the tension between credi-
ble but unproven Aboriginal assertions and the potentially negative 
impacts of government authorized activities on those assertions. In their 
submissions before the Supreme Court, the Haida Nation, Taku River 
Tlingit First Nation, and several of the intervener First Nations stated 
that governments were using to their advantage either cumbersome and 
elaborate treaty processes or lengthy court proceedings to postpone or 
prolong the actual recognition and determination of Aboriginal rights, 
thereby avoiding consultation obligations and exploiting natural re-
sources without reference or concern for the potential existence of Abo-
riginal rights and title. If that were allowed to continue, Aboriginal 
peoples could face pyrrhic victories. Although their asserted rights 
would eventually be recognized, the benefit of those rights, i.e., the 
resources, would no longer exist. For their part, many of the govern-
ments that participated in the appeal highlighted the difficulties associ-
ated with the management of the particular resources at stake with the 
understanding and balancing of insufficiently certain Aboriginal asser-
tions, particularly in instances where the assertions were not nearly as 
strong as those in the two cases before the Court. The governments 
cautioned that the viability of certain resource industries could be at 
stake if the consultation threshold was too low.  
Against this tension, the attractiveness of the honour of the Crown 
as a governing legal concept to the Court is almost obvious. In Taku 
River the Court noted:  
The duty of honour derives from the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty 
in the face of prior Aboriginal occupation. It has been enshrined in  
s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which recognizes and affirms 
existing Aboriginal rights and titles. Section 35(1) has, as one of its 
purposes, negotiation of just settlement of Aboriginal claims. In all its 
dealings with Aboriginal peoples, the Crown must act honourably, in 
accordance with its historical and future relationship with the 
Aboriginal peoples in question. The Crown’s honour cannot be 
                                                                                                                                
11
  See e.g., R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, at 1110, 1114 (Ab-
original rights context); and R. v. Badger, [1996] S.C.J. No. 39, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, at 813 (treaty 
rights context). 
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interpreted narrowly or technically, but must be given full effect in 
order to promote the process of reconciliation mandated by s. 35(1).12 
If the honour of the Crown is such that the Crown must always act 
honourably and if the exercise of discretionary control by the Crown 
raises significant risks that potential Aboriginal interests, which are 
embedded in active Aboriginal claims, are at risk of being compro-
mised, then consultation, and where necessary accommodation, is seen 
as a significant way of maintaining the Crown’s honour.  
The generosity with which the Crown’s honour is to be interpreted 
should not obscure the Court’s sensitivity and understanding of the 
challenges posed by either uncertain Aboriginal assertions or assertions 
in dispute. That sensitivity is reflected in the broad parameters to the 
Crown’s honour that are highlighted in both judgments. 
First, the Court had no difficulty appreciating the uncertainty of dis-
puted assertions, and as a result, it rejected the Court of Appeal’s ap-
proach to consultation as an obligation that is free-standing, grounded in 
fiduciary law. Specifically, it stated that the mere assertion of a right 
was insufficient to engage the Crown’s honour in a way that required 
the Crown to act in the Aboriginal groups’ best interests, as a fiduciary 
when it exercised discretionary control over the subject of the asserted 
right or title.13  
Second, the honour of the Crown, while significant as a source of 
government duties and obligations, is shaped by the interaction between 
asserted rights that carry potential section 35 protection and government 
authorized activities that might affect the asserted rights. In other words, 
the honour of the Crown is informed by the potential risk of infringe-
ment and the implication of “dishonourable conduct.” If on the one hand 
the Crown can do no wrong and on the other there is a risk of a wrong, 
then consultation is seen to be capable of preserving the Crown’s hon-
our: 
The potential rights embedded in these claims are protected by s. 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982. The honour of the Crown requires that 
these rights be determined, recognized and respected. This, in turn, 
requires the Crown, acting honourably, to participate in processes of 
negotiation. While this process continues, the honour of the Crown 
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  Taku River Tlingit First Nation, supra, at para. 24. 
13
  Haida, supra, note 1, at para. 18. 
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may require it to consult and, where indicated, accommodate 
Aboriginal interests. 14 
Taken out of context, it is tempting to interpret the Court’s com-
ments as outlining positive duties to identify Aboriginal rights and nego-
tiate with Aboriginal peoples even in the absence of potentially 
infringing activities by the government. But in the context of the two 
cases, the Court’s direction has to be understood in terms of the gov-
ernment’s potentially infringing conduct. Recalling that in Haida the 
determination of the asserted title and right was caught up in a slow and 
seemingly unproductive treaty process, the Court signalled that while 
the process of negotiation continued, government-authorized activities 
that might comprise the content of the assertions could not proceed 
without consultation and possibly accommodation. It is far from certain, 
however, that in the absence of potentially infringing activities the Court 
envisioned that governments would be obligated to initiate negotiations 
with Aboriginal peoples.  
That the context of the two cases is relevant and that there are con-
tours to the honour of the Crown and to its application is further reflect-
ed in the following conclusion: 
The Crown, acting honourably, cannot cavalierly run roughshod over 
Aboriginal interests where clams affecting these interests are being 
seriously pursued in the process of treaty negotiation and proof. It 
must respect these potential, but yet unproven, interests. The Crown is 
not rendered impotent. It may continue to manage the resource in 
question pending claims resolution. But, depending on the 
circumstances, discussed more fully below, the honour of the Crown 
may require it to consult with and reasonably accommodate 
Aboriginal interests pending resolution of the claim. To unilaterally 
exploit a claimed resource during the process of proving and resolving 
the Aboriginal claim to that resource, may be to deprive the Aboriginal 
claimants of some or all of the benefit of the resource. That is not 
honourable.
 15  
This analysis is grounded squarely on the Court’s Aboriginal legal 
framework that was introduced in Sparrow,16 considered further in cases 
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 Id., at para. 25. 
15
  Id., at para. 27 (emphasis added). 
16
  Supra, at note 11. 
472  Supreme Court Law Review (2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
such as Gladstone17 and in Nikal18 and which culminated in 
Delgamuukw19 where the Court noted: 
The Aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1), including 
Aboriginal title, are not absolute. Those rights may be infringed, both by 
the federal (e.g., Sparrow) and provincial (e.g., Côté) governments.20 
Acting honourably then, the Crown has to determine, recognize and 
respect those claims that have already been established by treaty or 
judicial decision or that are either being negotiated or litigated. As those 
processes unfold, if Aboriginal interests stemming from those claims 
run the risk of being affected by government action, the Crown must act 
honourably and in good faith. It must act with integrity, avoiding even 
the appearance of sharp dealing. This articulation is consistent with the 
approach taken in earlier Aboriginal cases.21 
The counterpoint to the obligations emerging out of the Crown’s 
honour is the Court’s explicit recognition that the Crown may manage 
its resource and address other public interests. In both decisions, the 
Court recognizes repeatedly that the Crown must balance Aboriginal 
concerns with other societal interests. The Court also acknowledged that 
the Crown might have to make decisions in the face of disagreement as 
to the adequacy of its response to the Aboriginal concerns. In the face of 
a good faith and transparent process, such disagreement would not be 
fatal to a Crown decision.22 In fact, the Court explicitly stated, “[m]ere 
hard bargaining will not offend an Aboriginal people’s right to be con-
                                                                                                                                
17
  R. v. Gladstone, [1996] S.C.J. No. 79, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723. 
18
  R. v. Nikal, [1996] S.C.J. No. 47, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013. 
19
  Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010. 
20
  Id., at para. 160. 
21
  In R. v. Marshall, [1999] S.C.J. No. 55, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, Binnie J. analyzed the 
honour of the Crown in the following terms (at para. 49): 
…the honour of the Crown is always at stake in its dealings with aboriginal people. 
This is one of the principles of interpretation set forth in Badger, supra, by Cory J., at para. 
41:  
 ... the honour of the Crown is always at stake in its dealings with Indian people. Inter-
pretations of treaties and statutory provisions which have an impact upon treaty or abo-
riginal rights must be approached in a manner which maintains the integrity of the 
Crown. It is always assumed that the Crown intends to fulfil its promises. No appear-
ance of “sharp dealing” will be sanctioned. 
See also Ontario Mining Co. v. Seybold (1901), 32 S.C.R. 1, at 2. 
22
  Haida, supra, note 1, at paras. 45, 50, & 61. 
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sulted.”23 The outcome in Taku River underscored the Court’s analysis 
in that case and lent significant credibility to its concern that it offer a 
framework that could enable the balancing of Aboriginal interests and 
allow the Crown some latitude in the conduct of its affairs.  
(b) The Timing, Scope and Content of the Duty to Consult and  
Accommodate 
Credible but unproven claims are enough to trigger consultation ob-
ligations. Honourable conduct, good faith and fair dealing, and the bal-
ancing of interests inform the timing, scope, and the content of 
consultation. Beginning with the question of when the duty to consult is 
triggered, the Court set up a very low threshold. Consultation, and 
where necessary accommodation, before the final determination of 
claims was described as, “an essential corollary to the honourable pro-
cess of reconciliation that s. 35 demands.” 24 As a duty that is founded on 
the Crown’s honour and the ultimate goal of reconciliation, consultation 
is required “when the Crown has knowledge, real or constructive, of the 
potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title and contemplates 
conduct that might adversely affect it.”25 In response to the practical 
concern that the very uncertainty over the potential nature of the claim 
impedes the ability to meaningfully discuss interim accommodations, 
the Court acknowledged the difficulty and responded by drawing a 
distinction between the duty to consult and its scope or content and 
concluded that:  
 There is a distinction between knowledge sufficient to trigger a 
duty to consult and, if appropriate, accommodate, and the content or 
scope of the duty in a particular case. Knowledge of a credible but 
unproven claim suffices to trigger a duty to consult and accommodate. 
The content of the duty, however, varies with the circumstances, as 
discussed more fully below. A dubious or peripheral claim may attract 
a mere duty of notice, while a stronger claim may attract more 
stringent duties. The law is capable of differentiating between tenuous 
claims, claims possessing a strong prima facie case, and established 
claims. Parties can assess these matters, and if they cannot agree, 
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tribunals and courts can assist. Difficulties associated with the absence 
of proof and definition of claims are addressed by assigning 
appropriate content to the duty, not by denying the existence of a 
duty.26 
The Court then explained that the content of the duty to consult 
would vary with the circumstances. Explicitly transposing the consulta-
tion spectrum articulated by Lamer C.J. in Delgamuukw27 for cases 
where the Aboriginal right was not in dispute, the Court concluded that 
the scope of the consultation would be proportionate to a preliminary 
assessment of the strength of an Aboriginal assertion and the seriousness 
or extent of the potentially adverse effect upon the right or title claimed. 
That spectrum would allow for the requisite flexibility to conduct good 
faith meaningful consultations appropriate to the particular circumstanc-
es.28 At one end of the spectrum lie cases where either the claim to title 
is weak, the Aboriginal right is limited, or the potential for infringement 
is minor.29 In such instances the duty on the Crown would be limited to 
giving notice, disclosing information, and discussing any issues raised 
in response to the notice. At the other end of the spectrum lie strong 
prima facie cases, where the right and potential infringement is signifi-
cant, and the risk of non-compensable damages is high.30 At that end of 
the spectrum, the consultation would have to be “deep” requiring the 
opportunity to make submissions for consideration, formal participation 
by the relevant Aboriginal group in the decision-making process, and 
the provision of written reasons demonstrating that the Aboriginal con-
cerns were considered and explaining how those submissions impacted 
on the decision.  
Over and above consultation, the accommodation of an Aboriginal 
assertion is mandated in instances where there is a strong prima facie 
case for the claim and where the consequences of the government’s 
proposed action may adversely affect the interests subsumed within that 
claim in a significant way. The Court spoke of accommodation as an 
interlocutory or quasi-injunctive measure that would avoid irreparable 
harm or that would minimize the effects of infringement, pending final 
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resolution of the underlying claim. Following a review of dictionary 
definitions of the term “accommodation,” the Court concluded: 
The accommodation that may result from pre-proof consultation is just 
this — seeking compromise in an attempt to harmonize conflicting 
interests and move further down the path of reconciliation.31 
(c) Provincial Jurisdiction and the Capacity to Act Honourably 
An essential element in the overall analytical framework is the im-
plicit and explicit role of provincial governments. Consistent with the 
observations in Delgamuukw that provinces could infringe section 35 
rights with the appropriate justification measures, the Court reminded 
everyone that by virtue of section 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and 
implicitly, sections 92(5) and (13) of the same Act, the provinces have 
the necessary tools to effect consultation. Contrary to Professor 
McNeil’s suggestion that provinces might not have the jurisdiction to 
infringe Aboriginal title for the purposes of resource development,32 the 
Court could have, but chose not to question provincial jurisdiction. 
Rather than dispute provincial ownership of its lands, it concluded that 
through their legislative authority over provincial resources, govern-
ments could incorporate legal requirements to meet their constitutional 
obligations. In echoing the need for relevant legislation to provide guid-
ance on consultation,33 the Court mapped out the path that governments 
ought to follow to balance the societal interests of the “distinctive Abo-
riginal societies” with the broader political community of which they are 
part.34  
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(d) The Obligations of Aboriginal Claimants 
Consistent with its overall view of reconciliation as a process of 
give and take, of compromise, and of harmony, the Court was clear that 
good faith conduct is required on both sides. It specifically noted that 
Aboriginal claimants must neither frustrate reasonable good faith efforts 
to consult nor take unreasonable positions “to thwart government from 
making decisions or acting in cases, where despite meaningful consulta-
tion, agreement is not reached.”35 Although the Court’s commentary on 
what constitutes good faith conduct on the part of Aboriginal claimants 
is limited, it clearly noted that claimants can facilitate the process by 
outlining their claims with clarity and focusing on the scope and nature 
of the Aboriginal rights being asserted as well as the alleged infringe-
ments.36 This would likely include the requirement that claimants re-
spond to government notices and invitations to consult in a timely 
manner, that they offer sufficient information to the government to ena-
ble the assessment of the strength of a particular assertion, and that they 
articulate how a contemplated government action might impact on the 
asserted right.  
In the absence of such information, even with the best of good faith 
intentions by a government, it would be virtually impossible to effect 
any meaningful consultation. It should also be noted that in linking the 
strength of the assertion with the extent of the potential infringement, 
the Court drew a direct relationship between the two. That is, the asser-
tion must be credible, the underlying claim must be more than dubious, 
and the likelihood that the contemplated government action might in-
fringe must also be articulated. If the contemplated government activity 
does not amount to an infringement then the consultation would fall at 
the low end of the spectrum. While it is fair to agree that the only way to 
really assess both variables of the equation is through dialogue, that 
cannot be done, and consultation cannot be meaningful, without the 
participation of all sides.  
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III. HAIDA NATION AND TAKU RIVER TLINGIT FIRST NATION AGAINST 
THE BROADER CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
The Court’s emphasis on the honour of the Crown and the duty to 
consult and, in some instances, accommodate in the face of credible but 
unproven or uncertain rights is significant, and the meaning of the two 
judgments read together should not be underestimated. By extension, 
however, the suggestion that these judgments have completely changed 
the jurisprudence as it concerns Aboriginal issues obscures this Court’s 
concept of reconciliation.  
Reconciliation in the Aboriginal discourse is not new.37 What is new 
is the Court’s view of reconciliation in Crown-Aboriginal relations as an 
ongoing process of living together involving mutual recognition and 
respect. The process of information exchanges, of meaningful discus-
sion, of participation in decision-making, the understanding of various 
perspectives, the flexibility, and the give and take required to accommo-
date Aboriginal interests grow out of the Court’s vision of how the Con-
stitution operates as a whole to effect unity within a plane of diversity.  
The vision of reconciliation as a critical constitutional value to de-
mocracy was considered extensively in the Secession Reference case.38 
In that instance, the Court used the Constitution as its touchstone to 
respond to various questions concerning a future secession by Quebec. 
Its essential approach to the problem was to view Canadian constitu-
tional democracy “as a ‘global system of rules and principles’ for the 
‘reconciliation of diversity with unity’ by means of ‘continuous pro-
cesses’ of democratic discussion, negotiation and change.”39 The out-
come was to direct the parties to work within the confines of the 
Constitution to develop a complex set of practices in which the conflicts 
over the recognition of diversity and the requirements of unity would be 
conciliated over time.40  
The Court grounded constitutional reconciliation on four vital and 
underlying constitutional principles that act in symbiosis such that one 
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cannot trump the others: federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and 
the rule of law, and respect for minority rights.41 Taken together:  
 The principles assist in the interpretation of the text and the 
delineation of spheres of jurisdiction, the scope of rights and 
obligations, and the role of our political institutions. Equally 
important, observance of and respect for these principles is essential to 
the ongoing process of constitutional development and evolution of 
our Constitution as a “living tree.”42  
Working through the specific principles, the Court concluded:  
Our political and constitutional practice has adhered to an underlying 
principle of federalism, and has interpreted the written provisions of 
the Constitution in this light.43 
… 
In interpreting our Constitution, the courts have always been 
concerned with the federalism principle, inherent in the structure of 
our constitutional arrangements, which has from the beginning been 
the lodestar by which the courts have been guided.44 
And building on that, the Court stated: 
[T]here can be little doubt that the principle of federalism remains a 
central organizational theme of our Constitution. Less obviously, 
perhaps, but certainly of equal importance, federalism is a political and 
legal response to underlying social and political realities.45 
Blending federalism with the principles of democracy, the Court 
then noted: 
A federal system of government enables different provinces to pursue 
policies responsive to the particular concerns and interests of people in 
that province. At the same time, Canada as a whole is also a 
democratic community in which citizens construct and achieve goals 
on a national scale through a federal government acting within the 
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limits of its jurisdiction. The function of federalism is to enable 
citizens to participate concurrently in different collectivities and to 
pursue goals at both a provincial and a federal level.46 
The weaving of these principles culminated in the view of reconcili-
ation as an essential requirement for the operation of a democratic sys-
tem of government. The contours of reconciliation were explained in the 
following way: 
 Finally, we highlight that a functioning democracy requires a 
continuous process of discussion. The Constitution mandates 
government by democratic legislatures, and an executive accountable 
to them, “resting ultimately on public opinion reached by discussion 
and the interplay of ideas” (Saumur v. City of Quebec, supra, at 
p. 330). At both the federal and provincial level, by its very nature, the 
need to build majorities necessitates compromise, negotiation, and 
deliberation. No one has a monopoly on truth, and our system is 
predicated on the faith that in the marketplace of ideas, the best 
solutions to public problems will rise to the top. Inevitably, there will 
be dissenting voices. A democratic system of government is 
committed to considering those dissenting voices, and seeking to 
acknowledge and address those voices in the laws by which all in the 
community must live.47 
And so as to remove any doubt that this process of discussion might be 
limited to a federal-provincial context, the Court specifically turned its 
mind to section 35(1) noting that section’s explicit role of protecting 
existing Aboriginal and treaty rights.48  
With the above as the model for dialogue within the Constitution, 
the Court also made some significant comments about the role of the 
courts generally in the assessment of constitutional disputes and resolu-
tions. Albeit in the context of potential secession negotiations, the Court 
cautioned that a court would not have access to all of the information 
available to political actors. It also noted that the methods appropriate 
for the search for truth in a court of law were ill-suited to understanding 
and drawing conclusions over constitutional negotiations. It concluded 
that: 
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…it is the obligation of the elected representatives to give concrete 
form to the discharge of their constitutional obligations which only 
they and their electors can ultimately assess. The reconciliation of the 
various legitimate constitutional interests outlined above is necessarily 
committed to the political rather than the judicial realm, precisely 
because that reconciliation can only be achieved through the give and 
take of the negotiation process. Having established the legal 
framework, it would be for the democratically elected leadership of 
the various participants to resolve their differences.49  
The noted remarks in the Secession Reference explain much about 
the unspoken premises that inform the proposed solution to the chal-
lenges in Haida and in Taku River. They also offer a glimpse as to what 
might follow in future cases.  
First, in the face of the resounding confidence in the federal system 
and the recognition that the principle of federalism remains an organiza-
tional theme of the Constitution, it should come as no surprise that the 
Court demonstrated little patience for British Columbia’s submission 
that somehow it did not have consultation obligations. It also might 
explain why the Court may not be prepared to eclipse the provinces’ 
control and regulation of their resources by denying them jurisdiction. 
Such an approach could jeopardize the underlying principles of federal-
ism, and in particular the division of powers. Confidence in the federal 
system and the Constitution is another reason to conclude that the Court 
sought to strengthen the existing constitutional paradigm rather than 
introduce any significant shifts. 
Second, the Court’s very deliberate observation that nobody has a 
monopoly on truth, and that seeking to acknowledge and address dis-
senting voices in the laws of the community reflects tremendous depth 
in the content of consultation and reconciliation. It is only when one 
appreciates that depth that one can make sense of the following: 
Every case must be approached individually. Each must also be 
approached flexibly, since the level of consultation required may 
change as the process goes on and new information comes to light. 
The controlling question in all situations is what is required to 
maintain the honour of the Crown and to effect reconciliation between 
the Crown and the Aboriginal peoples with respect to the interests at 
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stake. Pending settlement, the Crown is bound by its honour to balance 
societal and Aboriginal interests in making decisions that may affect 
Aboriginal claims. The Crown may be required to make decision in 
the face of disagreement as to the adequacy of its response to 
Aboriginal concerns. Balance and compromise will then be 
necessary.50  
But that depth also brings into focus the complexities and challeng-
es of consultation. When read in conjunction with the Secession Refer-
ence case what also comes into focus is the extent to which the honour 
of the Crown and the upholding of constitutional values find expression 
in consultation and reconciliation.  
Third, the Court’s comments on its role in the constitutional dis-
course finds parallel remarks in Haida and in Taku River. In those 
judgments, although the standard of review was not directly an issue, 
the Court explained that governments would be held to a standard of 
reasonableness, the implication being that Courts should not second 
guess the assessment and conclusion of the decision makers. So long as 
reasonable efforts to consult were made by governments, they would be 
seen to discharge their duties. While it is fair to conclude that the Court 
will expect governments to follow its strong invitation to provide guide-
lines to decision makers, to use their legislative powers as necessary to 
respond to Aboriginal interests and to promote reconciliation, for the 
same reasons that the Court stated that it was ill-suited to assess the 
outcome of constitutional negotiation, the Court will likely be reluctant 
to second guess Aboriginal consultation processes.  
IV. ACHIEVING RECONCILIATION 
The glaring question in this discourse is whether the reconciliation 
envisioned by the Supreme Court in these two judgments can work in 
the context of Aboriginal issues. The Court’s model implies that the 
Aboriginal group advancing an assertion and the relevant government 
decision makers, in conjunction in many cases with third party propo-
nents, can evaluate the strength and credibility of the assertion, reach 
agreement on the scope and content of the assertion, and then fashion 
interim arrangements that presumably minimize the impact on the  
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asserted rights, but in most instances, enable the particular activity to 
proceed.  
As straightforward as that might sound, it is far from clear that the 
proposed efforts can unfold smoothly to effect reconciliation. A number 
of reasons inform this conclusion. First, the content of reconciliation, 
i.e., the give and take, the compromise, and/or the sharing, is premised 
on an equality of positions and an equality of bargaining power. Alt-
hough, in the appropriate factual circumstances the honour of the Crown 
may require a government to extend the appropriate resources to an 
Aboriginal group to enable the requisite dialogue, it is far from certain 
that such would be enough to level the playing field. Empowerment, 
capacity building and respect are the kinds of elements that are essential 
to the success of reconciliation. That however cannot occur overnight.   
Second, the time required to effect reconciliation is typically entire-
ly out of step with the timelines involved in the authorization of gov-
ernment activities. Coming to terms with the content, extent, and scope 
of an assertion cannot be something that is rushed. By extension, how-
ever, the financial exigencies that inform third party development and 
activities that governments are asked to authorize mandate very different 
time requirements. Neither judgment offers any guidance on how to 
bridge the time gaps. If the timelines in Taku River are to be the meas-
ure, the inevitable question is how many parties, Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal proponents alike, have the financial means to stay a three 
and one half year course? And in the face of significant fiscal challeng-
es, can it really be said that taxpayers, through their governments, are in 
any better position to shoulder the burden?  
Third, it is far from certain that the lowering of the consultation 
threshold will advance dialogue, reduce the prospects of litigation and 
promote reconciliation. For all the good faith conduct that a government 
may demonstrate and for all the guidance that an Aboriginal party may 
offer, there may still be a fundamental disagreement over the validity, 
the content, the scope, and the implications of an asserted right. The 
determination of the strength of an assertion is an essential prerequisite 
to any negotiation. But not every assertion carries with it the kind of 
prima facie strength reflected in Haida. What consultation does, is to 
bring on the consideration of issues sooner rather than later. But if pro-
gress cannot be made and the parties end up in court, those are hardly 
circumstances that can foster the kind of give and take envisioned by the 
Court and required for reconciliation.  
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The fourth and perhaps most challenging dimension to reconcilia-
tion comes back to the issue of uncertainty. To the Court, uncertainty 
did not appear to be a problem because it viewed the reconciliation as an 
ongoing process. But in practical terms such uncertainty makes it very 
difficult to make any real progress. The Court described interim ar-
rangements and accommodation as quasi-injunctive in nature. But that 
carries the serious implication that when the assertions are finally de-
termined, those interim measures may or may not support the justifica-
tion requirements of section 35. The situation would be less of a 
problem if the interim arrangements exceeded the requirements of justi-
fication. The same could not be said if the interim arrangements fell 
short of justification. In such situations, in the absence of some agree-
ment concerning the future requirements of justification, the Aboriginal 
claimants would likely seek damages for any shortfall. Depending on 
the issue at stake that could have severe implications for governments. 
In the face of such prospects, what incentive would there be to work 
towards practical certainty? And if the further implication is that parties 
could not get beyond interim agreements and interim accommodation 
measures, would that really foster reconciliation or would it perpetuate a 
status quo that is less than satisfactory? 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Perhaps only time will tell how well reconciliation will fare in the 
Aboriginal discourse. In its observation that the content of consultation 
cannot be prescribed, that future cases will fill in the contours and con-
tent of consultation, it is clear that the Court was under no illusion about 
the challenges that lie ahead. But not every consultation has to be a 
problem. It is possible that through ongoing and deliberate dialogue that 
is premised on good faith efforts to accomplish mutual respect and mu-
tual understanding, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people alike can 
work towards reconciliation. And although such efforts take time, per-
haps the Court’s overriding objective was to signal that time was run-
ning out, and that the parties had to move forward in the direction of 
reconciliation. Even in the face of significant differences the Court is 
asking parties to forget about being negative and impeding dialogue. It 
urges everyone to work together to achieve positive results. That as an 
objective is an essential first step that ought not to be ignored. Chief 
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Justice Lamer said in Delgamuukw that, “we are all here to stay.”51 The 
judgments in Haida and Taku River ask everyone to make it work. 
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